Assessing the empirical relevance of labor frictions to business cycle fluctuations by Rodrigues Madeira, Joao Antonio
This is a repository copy of Assessing the empirical relevance of labor frictions to business
cycle fluctuations.




Rodrigues Madeira, Joao Antonio orcid.org/0000-0002-7380-9009 (2017) Assessing the 
empirical relevance of labor frictions to business cycle fluctuations. Oxford Bulletin of 





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 





This paper describes a DSGE model augmented with labor frictions, namely: in-
divisible labor, predetermined employment and adjustment costs. This improves the
t to the data as shown by a higher log marginal likelihood and closer match to key
business cycle statistics. The labor frictions introduced are relevant for model dynam-
ics and economic policy: the e¤ect of TFP shocks on most macroeconomic variables
is substantially mitigated; scal policy leads to a greater crowding out of private sec-
tor activity and monetary policy has a lower impact on output. Labor frictions also
provide a better match to impulse response functions from VAR models.
Total word count: 10,381
JEL Classication: E20, E24, E30, E31, E32.
Keywords: indivisible labor; labor adjustment costs; employment; hours.
University of York, Department of Economics and Related Studies. Comments are welcome at
joao.madeira@york.ac.uk. I am thankful to Simon Gilchrist, François Gourio, Robert King, Alberto Or-
tiz, Francesco Zanetti and two anonymous referees for useful suggestions. All errors are my own.
1
1 Introduction
The understanding of the role of labor markets to business cycle dynamics has for long been
viewed as a key question in macroeconomics. Keynes (1936) argued that a failure of the labor
market to clear was essential to the understanding of the Great Depression in the 1930s.
Labor markets was also at the core of Friedmans (1968) work which identied informational
problems as preventing labor markets from clearing at the natural rate of unemployment.
This proved to be invaluable to making sense of the emergence of stagation in the 1970s.
Despite this, for the most part, labor market rigidities have deserved relative little at-
tention by modern researchers working in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models for the purpose of the analysis of ination and output cyclical uctuations. Also,
those labor rigidities which have been most recently explored in the literature imply a de-
parture from Walrasian markets. These include search and matching frictions of workers to
jobs (Walsh, 2005, and Trigari, 2009), e¢ciency wages (Alexopoulos, 2004, Danthine and
Kurmann, 2004), imperfect competition in labor supply (Zanetti, 2007) and wage stickiness
(Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000). Of these only imperfect competition in labor supply
and wage stickiness have become widely adopted by DSGE researchers, being present in
several of the most commonly used references such as Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). While search and matching frictions have cer-
tainly proved insightful in the analysis of labor market ows (see for example Yashiv, 2006)
its importance to improving the t of DSGE models to the aggregate time series data still
remains to be proven (see Shimer, 2005, Krause and Lubik, 2007, Krause, Lopez-Salido and
Lubik, 2008, and Lubik, 2009).
In this paper I introduce labor frictions which do not imply a departure from Walrasian
labor markets into an otherwise standard New Keynesian (NK) model similar to Smets and
Wouters (2007).1 In particular, I assume labor to be indivisible (labor cannot be supplied in
1The Smets and Wouters (2007) model includes most real rigidities known to be empirically relevant for
DSGE models. Firm specic production factors, as in Woodford (2005), are among the few frictions absent
from the model. For an empirical assessment of rm specic employment see Madeira (2014) and for rm
specic capital see Madeira (2015).
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continuous units, households are constrained to be either in a straight time shift, a straight
time and overtime shift or unemployed), predetermined straight time employment numbers
(in which case, rms adjust overtime employment to respond to unexpected shocks) and
convex labor adjustment costs. Therefore, similarly to Blanchard and Galí (2010), the model
allows for unemployment, has elements common to those found in search and match models
(which typically also assume indivisible labor and predetermined employment), but abstracts
from other less essential ingredients (for example, vacancies are lled immediately which is
not the case in standard formulations of search and match models).
The labor rigidities introduced are motivated by empirical evidence and legislation re-
quirements: 1) Studies summarized in Hamermesh (1993), show that the lag in adjusting
employment demand to be three to 6 months and that hours per worker adjust more rapidly
than employment (Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin, 2010, show that the pattern of a quicker ad-
justment in hours relative to employment also occurred in the 2007 recession);2 2) Empirical
studies at the micro level indicate that labor adjustment costs are quite signicant (see
Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996), with some suggesting they amount to as much as one year
payroll for the average worker (notice that this excludes costs which are harder to measure,
such as disruptions to production from changing the number of employees); 3) The Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime pay provisions cover more than 80% of workers and
overall compliance rates are around 90% (see Trejo, 1991).3
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods (as in Smets and Wouters, 2007, and
Gertler, Sala and Trigari, 2008) which has become the most popular approach in macro-
econometrics (see Fernández-Villaverde, 2009). This approach is based on the likelihood
which uses all the information in a sample and provides a useful tool for model compari-
2Furthermore, Hansen and Sargent (1988) using a vector autoregressive (VAR) approach nd that over-
time employment appears to adjust more rapidly than full time employment to output innovations. This
indicates that many rms are likely to be constrained in the short run in adjusting their total employment
and resort to overtime work in order to respond to unexpected uctuations. Other recent VAR studies con-
rm that employment and unemployment respond little (if at all) on impact to demand shocks (see Monacelli
et al., 2010, Brueckner and Pappa, 2012).
3As noted by Trejo (1991), it is surprising how little attention is given to overtime pay by economists.
Only 11% of workers earn the minimum wage or below, whereas about 25% of all employees work overtime
during a typical week (a fraction that has remained quite stable, see the references in Trejo, 1993).
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son that embodies a strong preference for parsimonious modelling (that is, it discriminates
against models with more parameters, see Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2004).
The estimation uses data on output, consumption, investment, interest rates, straight time
employment, overtime employment, ination and real wages.
Estimation results show that the combination of indivisible labor and adjustment costs
leads to a signicant improvement in the t to the data (as shown by a substantially higher
log marginal likelihood). The results also shown that the introduction of labor frictions
allows the DSGE model to better t the volatility, contemporaneous correlation with real
output growth and rst order autocorrelation of key macro variables.
The labor frictions introduced a¤ect the models dynamics considerably. The e¤ects of
total factor productivity (TFP) shocks on several macroeconomic variables is substantially
reduced due to costly adjustment of labor. The labor frictions considered also have impor-
tant considerations for policy makers. Expansionary scal policy is shown to have greater
negative e¤ects for consumption and investment. Monetary policy is found to have smaller
estimated e¤ects on output and hours worked when labor frictions are taken into account.
It is also shown that labor frictions allow the DSGE model to match better the impulse re-
sponse functions estimated with vector autoregressive (VAR) techniques. Moreover, variance
decomposition analysis shows that monetary policy shocks account for most uctuations at
business cycle frequencies in a DSGE model with labor frictions in contrast to what happens
in a standard NK model.
Prior studies showed that the labor frictions considered here proved to yield valuable
insights in the real business cycle (RBC) literature (see Rogerson, 1988, Hansen and Sargent,
1988, Hall, 1996, Chang, Doh and Schorfheide, 2007, and Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2008).
Similar types of features are commonplace (in both RBC and NK theory) in the modelling
of capital (time-to-build, variable capital utilization and convex adjustment costs). The
results in this paper argue these features need to be extended to labor markets in monetary
business cycle models as well (the labor share of output is twice that of capital, making the
implications even more relevant). This is likely to lead to a better understanding of labor,
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ination and output movements at the short to medium run horizon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The DSGE model is presented in the
next section, whereas the estimation results are presented in section 3. The analysis of
consequences to business cycle dynamics is made in section 4. The paper concludes in
section 5 with a discussion of the main ndings.
2 The baseline model
In this section I describe the baseline model which consists of a DSGE model similar to
Smets and Wouters (2007) but which is extended to include a wide range of labor frictions:
labor is considered indivisible (di¤erentiating between unemployment, straight time and
overtime employment - the model therefore allows for adjustment along both the intensive
and extensive margin in hours), rms must commit to the number of straight time workers
they will employ before observing shocks to the economy (but are able to adjust the number
of employees working overtime to respond to unexpected shocks) and rms also face convex
adjustment costs in changing the number of straight time workers.
2.1 Final goods producers
The nal consumption good, Yt, is produced by a perfectly competitive representative rm
by combining a continuum of intermediate goods (Y (i); i 2 [0; 1]) aggregated as in Kimball
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where Pt and Pt(i) are the price of the nal and intermediate goods respectively, and V
is a strictly concave and increasing function characterized by V (1) = 1. The time-varying
mark-up in the goods market "pt is determined by the following stochastic process:
ln "pt = (1  p) ln "







where pt is an IID-Normal error term. As in Smets and Wouters (2007) to simplify notation,
in what follows I leave out this argument.















2.2 Intermediate good rms








where Kst (i) is capital services used in production, N1;t(i) is the share of agents who work
the straight time shift (straight time employment) and N2;t(i) the share of agents who work
both shifts (overtime employment) and "at is total factor productivity.  represents the labor-
augmenting deterministic growth rate in the economy,  is the share of capital, h1 is the
length of the straight time shift, h2 is the length of the overtime shift and  is a xed cost.
It is assumed that "at follows the process:
ln "at = (1  a) ln "






with at representing an independent shock with normal distribution of mean zero and stan-
dard deviation a. The rms labor input is given by:
Lt(i) = h1N1;t(i) + h2N2;t(i): (5)






where Mt corresponds to the real price per period charged to rms per unit of straight time
employment (N1;t) by an agency which matches workers with rms on behalf of households,
W1;t is the nominal hourly wage of the straight shift and W2;t is the nominal hourly wage of
the overtime shift and Rkt corresponds to the real rental cost for capital services. The rst
order conditions (FOCs) are:



















where t(i) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production function and equals
marginal cost MCt which is the same for all rms.
Under Calvo pricing with partial indexation, the optimal price set by the rm that is





























where 1 p is the Calvo probability of being allowed to optimize ones price, p is the degree
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of indexation to past ination, ~Pt(i) is the newly set price, t = Pt=Pt 1 is ination and
 the steady state value, (t+s=t)(Pt=Pt+s) is the nominal discount factor for rms (
is the households subjective discount factor and t is the households Lagrange multiplier








































where xt = V
0 1(ut) and ut =
Pt(i)
Pt
 t. The curvature of the Kimball goods market aggregator












The aggregate price index is given by (notice that all rms will chose the same price ~Pt):



















Agents derive utility from consumption (Ct) and hours of leisure (Ht). The objective function









with the variable Ft = Ct 1 representing external habit formation and taken by the agent as
exogenous (because it reects the behavior of others, exemplifying the desire of "catching-up
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with the Joneses").  measures the degree of habit formation, v determines the disutility
from labor and  determines the elasticity of labor supply.
Each agent is endowed with T units of time each period. Ht can take one of three values:
-H if the agent is unemployed;
-H   t1 if the agent is employed but works the straight shift only;
-H   t1   t2 if the agent works both the straight and overtime shift.
I employ lotteries to convexify the commodity space. Assume 1;t and 2;t are the
probability of working just the straight time shift and the probability of working both shifts
respectively. Hence 1 1;t 2;t is the probability of being unemployed. An agents expected
single period utility, after normalizing the agents time endowment to unity (h1 = t1=T and
h2 = t2=T ), is then:





+2;t[log(Ct(j)  Ft) + v
1
1  
(1  h1   h2)
1 ]




Since capital markets are complete (consumption is the same for all agents), one can then





s log(Ct+s   Ft+s)  a1(N1;t+s  N2;t+s)  a2N2;t+s   a0(1 N1;t+s)];
where a0 =  v
1
1 




1 ; a2 =  v
1
1 
(1  h1   h2)
1 , N1;t = 1;t+
2;t andN2;t = 2;t. The representative agent maximizes the objective function above subject
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and the capital accumulation equation:






It represents investment expenditures, Zt is the degree of capital utilization, Kt is the
stock of capital (which becomes productive with a one period delay), Bt is the nominal
payo¤ of of a risk-less one period bond, Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate, Tt are
government transfers, W h1;t and W
h
2;t are the nominal hourly wage rates for respectively the
straight shift and overtime shift paid to households, Dft denotes rms prots, D
u
t denotes
prots distributed by labor unions, and Dat denotes prots from an agency which matches
workers with rms. The function S() is an increasing and convex function, of the usual
kind assumed in neoclassical investment theory, which satises S() = 0, S 0() = 0, and
S 00() = ',  is the depreciation rate and ' measures convex investment adjustment costs
in a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics. I assume that a(Zt) is increasing
and convex, capturing the idea that increased capital utilization increases the maintenance
cost of capital in terms of investment goods. In the steady state Z = 1 and a(1) = 0. To
solve the model, one needs only the inverse of the elasticity of the capital utilization cost
function: a0(1)=a00(1) = (1 	)=	.
The terms "bt and "
i
t represent respectively shocks to the risk premium and the investment-
specic technology process. These shocks are assumed to follow a rst-order autoregressive
process with an IID-Normal error term:
ln "bt = (1  b) ln "





ln "it = (1  i) ln "






The resulting rst-order conditions (FOCs) are:























































where kt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital accumulation constraint.
Tobins Q is Qt = 
k
t =t and equals one in the absence of adjustment costs.
The agency which matches workers with rms on behalf of households chooses N1;t+1

















The functionN() is an increasing and convex function, which satisesN(1) = N1, N
0(1) = 1
and H 00(1) = 'N1 = 2  'N . The parameter N1 can be interpreted as the exogenous quit
rate in employment and 'N measures the degree of labor adjustment costs. .
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It is important to discuss briey the costs involved in the decisions regarding straight
time employment and overtime employment. Straight time employment is subject to convex
adjustment costs and must be decided before costs to the economy are known. It might
appear then that agents would favor adjusting only overtime employment over the business
cycle. However, such an interpretation would be wrong because overtime hours are paid at









Therefore the wage rate for the overtime employment shift is a constant proportion of the
wage rate for straight time employment. The exact value of the overtime premium implied
by the model depends on the choice of parameter values. One obtains that the overtime
wage is about 41% higher than the straight time wage by setting H = 1369 (which implies
agents have 15 available hours per day for work and leisure), t1 = 516 (which implies a
40 hour per week straight time shift), t2 = 155 (the quarterly mean of overtime hours, for
details see Madeira, 2014) and v =  = 1 as is conventional in most macro models. The
model therefore can easily match a value close to the FLSA requirement that overtime wage
be time and a half the straight time wage (see Trejo, 1991).
2.4 Intermediate labor union sector
Households supply their homogenous labor to an intermediate labor union which di¤eren-
tiates the labor services and has market power. Unions o¤er those services to intermediate
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where Wd;t and Wd;t(j) are the price of the composite and intermediate labor services re-
spectively, and V w an aggregator function as in Kimball (1995) which is a strictly concave
and increasing function characterized by V w(1) = 1. The time-varying mark-up in the labor
market "wt is assumed to follow the stochastic process below:
ln "wt = (1  w) ln "







where wt is an IID-Normal error term. As in Smets and Wouters (2007) to simplify notation,
in what follows I leave out this argument.















Unions set nominal wages in staggered contracts. In particular, a constant fraction
(1  w) of wage contracts is renegotiated in each period. Wages which are not re-optimized
are assumed to be indexed to a weighted average of steady state and lagged ination. Unions
take into account the real wage desired by households given in (A13) and (A14) and labor
























































































wd;t. The markup of the aggregate wage over the
wage received by the households is distributed to the households in the form of dividends.












The aggregate wage indexes are given by:





















2.5 Government policies and market clearing


















where Y pt is potential output (dened as the output that would occurs with exible prices
and wages and no mark-up shocks), t is a shock to the ination objective and "
r
t is a
temporary shock to the interest rate. The parameter R is the steady state nominal rate
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(gross rate),  measures the degree of interest rate smoothing, r and ry are respectively
the weights on deviations from target ination and potential output (that is, the output
gap). There is also a short-run feedback from the change in deviations from potential
output determined by ry. The monetary policy shocks follow a rst-order autoregressive
process with an IID-Normal error term:
ln t = (1  ) ln 





ln "rt = (1  r) ln "





The government budget constraint is given by:




where Gt represents government spending which when expressed relative to the steady state
output path is denoted as "gt and follows the exogenous process shown below:
ln "gt = (1  g) ln "







where gt is an IID-Normal error term.
Finally, the aggregate economys resource constraint is:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + a(Zt)Kt 1 +Nt: (33)
3 Model Estimation
3.1 Estimation Methodology
I adopt a Bayesian estimation methodology similar to that of Smets and Wouters (2007).
The log posterior function (which combines the likelihood of the data with priors on the
models parameters) is maximized to yield estimates of the mode and standard deviation.
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The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is then used to obtain estimates of the mean of the
posterior distribution.
The dataset used consists of the following seasonally adjusted quarterly US aggregate time
series: 100 times the log di¤erence of the GDP deator (dlPt), real consumption (dlCONSt),
real investment (dlINVt), real wages (dlWAGt) and real GDP (dlGDPt), the fraction of the
civilian noninstitutional population employed in nonagriculture industries at work 35 hours
and over a week (N1t), the fraction of the civilian noninstitutional population employed in
nonagriculture industries at work 41 hours and over a week (N2t), and the federal funds rate
(FEDFUNDSt).
The estimation is done for the period 1984Q1 to 2007Q4. The reason for this is that
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) only collects data on N1t and N2t since 1976Q3. The
decision to start estimation in 1984Q1 was done to avoid any issues arising from potential
structural breaks in monetary policy in the late 70s or early 80s. The sample period ends
in 2007Q4 in order to avoid any potential estimation bias from nonlinearity associated with
the zero lower bound period.




















































































































































where l and dl stand respectively for log and log di¤erence, lower case variables represent
detrended real variables and hats denote variables in log deviation from the steady state.
The parameter  = 100(   1) is the common quarterly trend growth rate to real GDP,
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consumption, investment and wages, while  = 100(   1) and r = 100(R   1) are the
average values of ination and interest rate. The parameters n1 and n2 are the average values
of straight time employment and overtime employment, which are normalized to be equal to
zero.
3.2 Prior Distribution of the Parameters
The priors for the estimated parameters of the baseline model (Model 1) are similar to Smets
and Wouters (2007). To summarize briey. Some parameters are xed in the estimation
procedure. The depreciation rate  is xed at 0.025, the exogenous spending-GDP ratio is
set at 18%, the steady state mark-ups in the goods and labor markets ("p and "w) are set
at 1.5, the curvature parameters of the Kimball aggregators in the goods and labor market
("p and "w) are both set at 10, the steady state quit rate in employment (N1) is set at 0.1
(see Shimer, 2005), the straight time shift (h1) is set at 0.38 and the overtime shift (h2) at
0.11 (for details see Madeira, 2014). The parameters v and  are calibrated so that in the
steady state straight time employment and overtime employment are equal to 0.42 and 0.15
respectively (the mean values of their respective time series).
The quarterly trend growth rate  is assumed to be of mean 0.4 while the annualized
steady state ination and discount rates respective prior means are 2.5% and 1% respectively.
For the Taylor rule the mean prior ination and output gap weights (including the short run
reaction coe¢cient) are assumed have mean 1.5 and 0.125 respectively, which is consistent
with observed variations in the Federal Funds rate over the Greenspan era (see Taylor (1999)).
The prior distribution on the coe¢cient on the lagged interest rate is assumed to follow a
beta distribution with mean 0.75 which is consistent with the estimates of Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (2000).
The remaining prior means of the structural parameters are as follows: the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is set at 1.5, the habit parameter is set at 0.7, the adjustment cost
parameter for investment and employment are both set around 4, the capital share is set at
0.3, the capacity utilization elasticity is set at 0.5, nally the Calvo probabilities of prices
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and wages are assumed to be 0.66 and the degree of indexation of prices and wages assumed
to be 0.5.
The standard errors of the shocks are assumed to follow an inverse-gamma distribution
with a mean of 0.10. The autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) parameters are
assumed to be beta distributed with mean 0.5.
The rst three columns of tables 1 and 2 give an overview of the assumptions made
regarding the prior distribution (shape, mean and standard deviation) of the estimated
parameters. In order to assess the empirical relevance of labor frictions, Model 1 will be
compared to Model 2 which is identical in every aspect but does not assume predetermined
straight time employment and has the employment adjustment cost xed at only 0.2 (with
a value of zero the model would imply that the straight time employment and overtime
employment series are identical which is counterfactual) which is 20 times smaller than the
prior mean adopted for Model 1.
3.3 Parameter Estimates
For summary purposes I present only the mean and the standard deviation of the posterior
distributions for the parameters, a choice also made by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005).
Parameter estimates for Model 1 and Model 2 are broadly in line with those found in other
studies such as Smets and Wouters (2007).
A few parameters do appear to be a¤ected by the introduction of labor frictions and
due to space concerns I focus the discussion on those. The estimates of Model 1 for the
degree of investment adjustment costs (') and the Calvo wage stickiness probability of
nonadjustment (w) are respectively 5.63 and 0.7. In the case of Model 2 the estimates
for the same parameters are respectively 7.59 and 0.94. So the omission of relevant labor
frictions from DSGE models appears to bias upwards the estimates of these parameters.
Another structural parameter which was a¤ected was the capital share, which was estimated
at a value of 0.18 in Model 1 and 0.1 in Model 2.
In Model 1 the employment adjustment cost parameter ('N) was estimated to be 32.23.
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This is substantially higher than the mean prior value of 4 which was quite conservative
(chosen to be the same as that of investment adjustment costs). The estimate is quite close
to the 33 value adopted as the mean prior for labor adjustment costs by Chang, Doh and
Schorfheide (2007). A value of 33 implies that the average recruiting cost is about 50% of
a quarterly salary of a worker recruited (which matches the nation-wide average recruiting
expenses for new workers in the US, for details see Chang, Doh and Schorfheide, 2007).
With respect to the estimates of the volatility of exogenous shocks the di¤erences are
small except for the risk premium (b) and ination objective () shocks. The estimated
value of b is 0.21 for Model 1 and only 0.10 for Model 2. The lower volatility of the risk
premium shock in Model 2 is compensated by a higher degree of autocorrelation for this same
shock (b estimated at 0.88 in Model 2 but only 0.54 in Model 1) and a higher volatility
of the ination objective shock ( estimated at 0.24 in Model 2 but only 0.11 in Model
1). The MA coe¢cients of the price and wage mark-up processes are also di¤erent between
the models. Model 1 has a higher MA price mark-up coe¢cient (0.83 compared to 0.50 for
Model 2) but a lower MA wage mark-up coe¢cient (0.49 compared to 0.92 for Model 2).
4 Implications for Business Cycle Fluctuations
4.1 Data Fit
I use the marginal likelihood, obtained by modied harmonic mean estimation, to evaluate
the overall empirical performance of the models. The values are displayed in the last line of
Table 2. The log marginal likelihood is highest for Model 1 (-399.07 with Model 2 having
only -527.71). This suggests that labor frictions improve the New Keynesian models t
to the data. To evaluate how substantial this improvement is I made use of the Kass and
Raftery (KR) criterion. Kass and Raftery (1995) propose that values of twice the di¤erence
of the log marginal likelihoods of two models above 10 can be considered as very strong
evidence in favor of the model with highest log marginal likelihood. Comparing Model 1
with Model 2 yields a KR criterion of 257.28. The KR criterion therefore strongly supports
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the importance of labor frictions, namely labor adjustment costs, for the understanding of
business cycle uctuations. In Madeira (2013) it is shown that this conclusion is robust
to using 100 times the log of average hours worked (for the nonfarm business sector for all
persons), lHOURSt, instead of data on straight time employment and overtime employment,
as well as numerous modelling changes (such as not including habit formation, price and
wage indexation to lagged ination, having capital adjustment costs instead of investment
adjustment costs and several other di¤erences).
I now study the ability of Model 1 and Model 2 (simulated under their respective esti-
mated mean parameter values) to match the following key business cycle statistics for the
US aggregate time series data used to estimate the models: volatility (), contemporaneous
correlation with real output growth (y) and rst order autocorrelation (1). The results
are shown in Table 3 which also includes information for lHOURSt which was not used in
the estimation of the models (but is often used for DSGE model estimation). The counter-
part for the hours series in the Model 1 and Model 2 is the Lt variable. The results seem
to substantially favor Model 1, conrming the value of labor frictions to better understand
macroeconomic time series data. Model 1 matches 19 of the 27 US data statistics in Table 3
more closely than Model 2. Model 2 only matches better 5 of the 27 business cycle statistics
better than Model 1, which are: the volatility of real wage growth, the volatility of ination,
the volatility of interest rates, the contemporaneous correlation of real wage growth with
real output growth and the contemporaneous correlation of average hours worked with real
output growth. Model 1 and Model 2 do equally well in matching the volatility of consump-
tion growth, the contemporaneous correlation of real output growth with real output growth
(this is one for both models, as would be the case for any DSGE model) and the rst order
autocorrelation of straight time employment.
4.2 Impulse Response Functions
Due to space constraints only the impulse response functions (IRFs) for the total factor
productivity shock ("at ), scal policy ("
g




shown. The web appendix includes the IRFs of all shocks.
Figure 1 shows that Model 1 and Model 2 di¤er in their predictions for the estimated
mean responses of economic variables to exogenous changes to total factor productivity
in a statistically signicant way (the 90% condence interval, hence CI, is shown in the
gure). Figure 1 shows that labor frictions imply smaller average responses of most economic
variables (output, consumption, interest rates, ination and straight time employment) to a
total factor productivity shock.
The response of employment and hours to technology shocks is the subject of consid-
erable attention in macroeconomics. Galí (1999) using a structural VAR found that both
employment and hours decline in response to a positive technology shock. Later research
by Mumtaz and Zanetti (2012) also using a structural VAR but with additional restrictions
supports an increase in the use of labor in response to neutral technology shocks. In addition,
Mumtaz and Zanetti (2015) show that after allowing for time-varying coe¢cients that the
magnitude of the response of labor market variables to technology shocks varies across time.
The question of how technology shocks a¤ect labor markets therefore remains unsettled and
remains deserving of further investigation.
The intensity of the debate is due to the contradiction between the results of Galí (1999)
and the implication of basic RBC models (see for example King and Rebelo, 2000) that
positive technology shocks lead to an increase in hours worked. One way to reconcile RBC
research with the ndings of Galí (1999) is the introduction of search and match in the
labor market to RBC models (see Mandelman and Zanetti, 2014). This implies that labor
frictions are an important component in determining the response of employment and hours
to technology shocks. Therefore it is worth examining how the labor frictions considered
in this paper have impacted labor market dynamics with respect to productivity shocks.
The IRFs to a positive technology shock of Model 1 in Figure 1 show a negative reaction of
hours and overtime employment but a positive reaction of straight time employment. This
indicates that hours and employment can have opposite reaction to technology shocks and
adds a new dimension to the debate of the business cycle impact on labor markets from
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technology shocks.
Figure 2 shows the implications for economic variables of Model 1 and Model 2 with
respect to scal policy. Figure 2 shows that both Model 1 and Model 2 predict a similar
response of average hours worked. However, in the case of Model 1 this is accounted by
a larger increase in overtime employment relative to Model 2, while the estimated increase
in straight time employment of higher government spending is smaller for Model 1 than
for Model 2. Figure 2 also shows that labor frictions result in greater crowding out of
consumption and investment to scal expansion. Wages also fall by more in the case of
Model 1 relative to Model 2 in reaction to an increase in government spending. Taking into
account labor frictions suggests the benets of scal expansion to be smaller than those in
the conventional New Keynesian model while the adverse e¤ects are found to be larger.
Figure 3 shows the IRFs of Model 1 and Model 2 to a temporary 1% interest rate shock.
Figure 3 also includes the vector autoregressive (VAR) mean IRFs estimates to monetary
policy shocks of Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2004), hence ACEL. For the
sake of better exposition Figure 3 omits the CI of the IRFs of Model 1 and Model 2 (this
is however included in a gure shown in the web appendix, which conrms the di¤erences
between Model 1 and Model 2 are in fact statistically signicant). Figure 3 shows that Model
1 matches better than Model 2 the IRFs obtained by the VARmodel of ACEL with respect to
most variables (namely, output, consumption, investment, hours and interest rates). Model
2 seems to match the estimates of ACEL more closely with respect to wages. Both Model 1
and Model 2 seem to match the IRFs of the VAR with respect to ination equally well.
4.3 Variance Decomposition
The contribution of each of shock to the 20 quarter forecast error variance of real output
growth, ination and the nominal interest rate is shown in Table 4.4 The numbers for Model
4As indicated by King and Rebelo (2000) the cyclical component consists mainly of those parts of output
with periodicities between 6 and 32 quarters, since 20 quarters is approximately the midpoint of this interval,
I choose it as the variance decomposition forecast horizon in order to obtain a good characterization of the
relevant sources of business cycle uctuations
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1 and Model 2 in Table 4 were obtained using the respective mean parameter estimates
shown in tables 1 and 2.
Model 1 and Model 2 di¤er somewhat in how they account for uctuations in real output
growth. In both models, it is total factor productivity shocks which are the most relevant for
uctuations at the medium frequency. However, Model 1 places higher weight on government
spending and investment-specic technology shocks relative to Model 2 which instead places
higher weight on risk premium shocks. Both models place substantial weight on monetary
policy shocks. But Model 1 places substantial weight on both the temporary shock to the
interest rate and the shock to the ination objective, while Model 2 places most weight on
the temporary shock to the interest rate.
Just as with Smets and Wouters (2007), uctuations in ination at medium frequency
are nearly completely explained by exogenous movements in the mark-up shocks. So labor
frictions do not seem to a¤ect substantially the dynamics of ination. While Model 1 and
Model 2 share many similarities with respect to the driving forces of business cycle uc-
tuations of real output growth and ination, the same does not occur with respect to the
interest rate.
In Smets and Wouters (2007) monetary policy shocks account for most interest rate uc-
tuations at the short horizons (one and two quarters) but for only about 20% of uctuations
at medium horizons (10 and 40 quarters). This is consistent with what was obtained for
Model 2 with the two monetary policy shocks accounting for 26.95%. However, the intro-
duction of labor frictions changes this dramatically. In Model 1 it is shown that when labor
frictions are included that monetary policy shocks can account for most uctuations in the




This paper presents a New Keynesian model with a wide range of labor frictions: indivisible
labor, predetermined straight time employment numbers and labor adjustment costs. This
combination is proven to lead to signicant improvements of the log marginal likelihood
and in the matching of key business cycle moments. Labor frictions a¤ect the models
dynamics substantially. Costly labor adjustment mitigates the reaction of most economic
variables to total factor productivity shocks. Fiscal policy is shown to imply a greater
crowding out of consumption and investment expenses under models with labor frictions.
This suggests that an important topic for future research is to examine the consequences of
labor frictions to scal multipliers at the zero lower bound. The introduction of labor frictions
also enables the New Keynesian model to better match the estimated reaction to monetary
policy shocks obtained from VAR models. Finally, a variance decomposition analysis implies
that when labor frictions are taken into account that monetary policy shocks account for
most uctuations at business cycle frequencies.
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6 Tables
Table 1: Bayesian Estimation of Structural Parameters
Prior Distribution Estimated Maximum Posterior
Model 1 Model 2
Type Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
n1 Normal 0.00 2.00 -2.34 1.27 -2.83 1.67
n2 Normal 0.00 2.00 0.93 1.88 0.18 2.00
 Normal 0.40 0.10 0.45 0.02 0.44 0.01
100( 1   1) Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08
 Gamma 0.625 0.10 0.56 0.05 0.63 0.08
 Beta 0.70 0.10 0.39 0.05 0.31 0.07
	 Beta 0.50 0.15 0.70 0.09 0.72 0.09
' Normal 4.00 1.50 5.63 1.29 7.59 1.15
'N Normal 4.00 5.00 32.23 3.18 - -
 Normal 0.30 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.10 0.01
p Beta 0.66 0.10 0.96 0.01 0.94 0.02
w Beta 0.66 0.10 0.70 0.06 0.94 0.04
tp Beta 0.50 0.15 0.52 0.12 0.47 0.09
tw Beta 0.50 0.15 0.45 0.16 0.48 0.16
 Beta 0.75 0.10 0.80 0.04 0.87 0.05
r Normal 1.500 0.25 1.36 0.22 1.56 0.24
ry Normal 0.125 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.04
ry Normal 0.125 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.42 0.04
The data covers the period between 1984Q1 to 2007Q4.
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Table 2: Bayesian Estimation of Exogenous Shock Parameters
Prior Distribution Estimated Maximum Posterior
Model 1 Model 2
Type Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
a Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.34 0.02 0.35 0.03
b Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.21 0.03 0.10 0.02
g Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.26 0.02 0.20 0.02
i Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.40 0.05 0.42 0.05
r Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.15 0.01 0.17 0.02
 Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.11 0.02 0.24 0.06
p Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.01
w Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.37 0.04 0.39 0.03
a Beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.01 0.99 0.01
b Beta 0.50 0.20 0.54 0.11 0.88 0.02
g Beta 0.50 0.20 0.94 0.01 0.91 0.02
i Beta 0.50 0.20 0.55 0.08 0.52 0.06
r Beta 0.50 0.20 0.47 0.06 0.41 0.08
 Beta 0.50 0.20 0.98 0.01 0.96 0.01
p Beta 0.50 0.20 0.54 0.07 0.47 0.09
w Beta 0.50 0.20 0.61 0.18 0.88 0.07
p Beta 0.50 0.20 0.83 0.03 0.50 0.12
w Beta 0.50 0.20 0.49 0.20 0.92 0.05
ga Beta 0.50 0.25 0.82 0.09 0.89 0.06
Log data density (modied harmonic mean) -399.07 -527.71
The data covers the period between 1984Q1 to 2007Q4.
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Table 3: Business Cycle Statistics
US data Model 1 Model 2
 y 1  y 1  y 1
dlGDPt 0.54* 1.00** 0.21* 0.79 1.00 0.23 1.09 1.00 0.15
dlCONSt 0.50** 0.56* 0.07* 0.91 0.76 0.25 0.91 0.78 0.44
dlINVt 1.47* 0.61* 0.52* 1.78 0.61 0.56 1.80 0.30 0.59
dlWAGt 0.72 0.00 0.14* 0.84 0.23 0.18 0.72 0.16 0.03
lHOURSt 2.00* 0.03 0.97* 2.62 0.08 0.99 5.33 0.07 0.99
dlPt 0.23 -0.14* 0.59* 0.22 -0.07 0.65 0.23 0.02 0.66
FEDFUNDSt 0.59 0.09* 0.98* 0.29 0.02 0.90 0.54 0.41 0.87
lN1t 3.87* -0.28* 0.80** 3.02 -0.08 0.999 7.29 -0.07 0.999
lN2t 7.56* -0.02* 0.95* 17.11 0.27 0.97 30.28 0.29 0.99
The data covers the period between 1984Q1 to 2007Q4. * indicates Model 1 does better in
matching data. **indicates Model 1 and Model 2 do equally well in matching data.
Standard deviation of a variable is denoted by , contemporaneous correlation with real
output growth is denoted by y, and rst order autocorrelations is denoted by 1.
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dlGDPt (Model 1) 26.67 14.59 11.30 9.77 18.91 17.18 1.26 0.32
dlPt (Model 1) 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 6.61 93.27 0.06
FEDFUNDSt (Model 1) 0.46 11.23 0.93 3.65 56.51 15.38 11.01 0.83
dlGDPt (Model 2) 31.16 21.70 5.88 2.17 27.61 8.67 1.07 1.74
dlPt (Model 2) 1.91 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.07 8.55 82.54 6.89
FEDFUNDSt (Model 2) 0.69 65.32 0.97 0.78 4.61 22.34 1.46 3.83
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7 Figures
Figure 1: IRFs to a TFP shock (Model 1 and Model 2)
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Figure 2: IRFs to a scal policy shock (Model 1 and Model 2)
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Figure 3: IRFs to a 1% temporary interest rate shock (Model 1, Model 2 and VAR
ACEL)
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